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Should The U.S. Constitution's Treaty-Making Power Be Used
As The Basis For Enactment Of Domestic Legislation?
Implications of the Senate-Approved
Genocide Convention
by Robert A. Friedlander*
INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
It has been more than thirty-six years since the United Nations General
Assembly passed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide without dissenting vote.' It has been more than thirty-five
years since the Genocide Convention was first submitted by the executive
branch to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and nearly fifteen
years since its resubmission during the divisive Vietnam war. There have
been three other considerations from 1971 to the present,' and the Senate
only just recently has given its advice and consent to this still controver-
sial instrument. In all this time, the world community has not collapsed
and the American republic has continued to be the staunch leader of the
freedom-loving nations of the world. No public outcry in support of the
Convention has reverberated throughout congressional corridors, and no
fatal injury to the international protection of human rights has been sus-
tained because of the U.S. abstention.
To the contrary, if genocide is defined as mass murder either of a
particular nationality or of an identifiable group, then that supposed in-
ternationally proscribed criminal behavior has become embarrassingly
* Ph.D., Northwestern University (1963); J.D., DePaul University, School of Law (1973); Pro-
fessor of Law (on leave), Ohio Northern University College of Law; Assistant Counsel, Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution, Committee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate;
Member, Advisory Board, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. This article is re-
printed here with some slight modification from its original publication in Constitutional Issues Re-
lating to the Proposed Genocide Convention: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1985) (prepared statement of Robert A.
Friedlander, Professor of Law, Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University).
1 Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force, Jan. 12, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Geno-
cide Convention].
2 For a short history of the five different hearings held on the Genocide Convention and their
result, see COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S. EXEC. REP. No. 50, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as FOREIGN REL. REP. (1984)].
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prevalent in the post-World War II decades.' Instead of arguing, as have
a number of American scholars, that the proscription of genocidal acts
constitutes a universal norm,4 the truth of the matter is that the practice
of genocide, as distinct from the prohibition, has been so widespread that
it sadly reflects modern global normative conduct. On the other hand, if
genocide is truly an international crime with individual liability for such
heinous activity,5 then why-except for Adolf Eichmann-has no indi-
vidual, let alone government, been brought to bar since the Convention
was first approved by the U.N. General Assembly in December, 1948?6
The first fundamental (and arguably fatal) flaw of the unreserved
Genocide Convention is the question of focus, or to place it in broader
perspective, the question of definition. In terms derived from our own
legal system, the definitions proffered by articles III and III' of the Con-
vention are vague and overbroad, arbitrary and capricious, and statuto-
rily unreasonable both in their construction and application. They are,
in American constitutional phraseology, violative of substantive due pro-
cess and could not withstand strict constitutional scrutiny by United
States federal courts, since criminal statutes in this country have to be
3 Cf L. KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1981); The
Genocide and Humanicide Symposium, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 299 (1981); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, vols. 1979-1983.
4 See, e.g., Edwards, Contributions of the Genocide Convention to the Development of Interna-
tional law, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 300, 305-06 (1981); Whiteman, 'Jus Cogens'in International Law,
with a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.-L. 609, 625 (1977). This was also the position of the
International Court of Justice. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (Advisory Opinion of May 28) [hereinafter cited
as Genocide Advisory Opinion]; The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, 1970 I.C.J. 3,
32 (Judgment of Feb. 5).
5 See Genocide Convention, art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
6 Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 30-42 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Eichmann Judgment]. Eichmann was convicted of crimes committed during the
Jewish Holocaust of the Second World War, which antedated the Genocide Convention of 1948.
7 In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to member of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
8 The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Id. art. III, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
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strictly construed in favor of the the defendant.9
In its 1951 Advisory Opinion on the reservations to the Genocide
Convention, the International Court of Justice (ICY) claimed that "[t]he
high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the com-
mon will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its provi-
sions."1 But this is not how American law operates, how the common
law applies, nor is it how international law is supposed to work. High
ideals and nobility of purpose are no substitute for the precision and
specificity of statute required either by the adversarial or the inquisitorial
criminal justice systems. The description of the "crime" of genocide pro-
vided by the restricted Genocide Convention is so expansive and all-in-
clusive as to cover almost any wrongdoer perpetrating almost any
criminal act of violence or advocacy of violence against almost every type
of victim.
The various classifications of subject victim groups put forward by
article II (national, ethnical, racial, or religious as such), encompasses
virtually all conceivable persons, except for those having a particular
political affiliation, which the drafting committee voted to discard over
the objections of the U.S. delegates, but with the support of the Soviet
Union.1 In retrospect, discarding the political affiliation classification
was probably just as well, since the inclusion of a political groups cate-
gory would have opened the way to every small, dissident, radical polit-
ical faction to raise a charge of genocide every time it was prevented from
achieving its immediate objectives or was denied major party recognition.
Moreover, the crimes enumerated in article II present some very serious
additional problems.
No American citizen or resident alien (legal or otherwise) seems to
be excluded from the sweep of this article. 2 As for the enumerated
crimes, (a) "Killing members of the group" does not allow for any de-
fenses; (b) "Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group" does not specify the degree of mental harm or distinguish
whether the injury includes psychological disorientation of a temporary
nature; (c) "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part" can lead
9 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 72-74 (1972).
10 Genocide Advisory Opinion, 151 I.C.J. at 23.
11 Serious Problems Raised by the Genocide Convention: Hearings on the Genocide Convention
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1950) (state-
ment of Alfred J. Schweppe) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings (1950)]; L. KUPER, supra note 3,
at 24-30.
12 The originator of the concept of genocide, Professor Raphael Lemkin, was, if possible, even
more inclusive, specifying the following categories: political, social, cultural, physical, biological,
moral, and religious. This, in effect, covered all humankind. See L. KUPER, supra note 3, at 30;
Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 147-148 n.6, 151
n.14 (1947).
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to charges raised by minority groups suffering from residential discrimi-
nation or ghetto life, or by native Americans seeking redress for the type
of existence found on Indian reservations; (d) "Imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group" can lead to complaints di-
rected against government agencies promoting contraceptives or against
government officials (including the U.S. Supreme Court) for allowing the
practice of abortion (the pro-life terrorists could end their bombing, and
could concentrate instead upon paralyzing the federal courts with a flood
of genocide actions); and (e) "Forcibly transferring children of the group
to another group" may involve the placing of minority dependent chil-
dren in foster homes. The list of possibilities for creative lawyers is prac-
tically endless.
Of even greater import, failure to specify a requisite size for a poten-
tial victim group in article I raises the possibility that a single victim
belonging to the above-listed groups may be sufficient for a genocide ac-
cusation. Despite denials of the State Department to the contrary, 13 the
Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, in his study of the prevention and punishment of genocide,
admits it was generally agreed in the debates of the Sixth (Legal) Com-
mittee during the drafting of the Convention that "it was not necessary
for the act to be aimed at a group in its entirety." He goes on to add:
"[a] number of writers also believe that the Convention should be inter-
preted as applying to cases of 'individual genocide'.' 4 That was also the
view of the U.S. representative on the Sixth Committee.' 5 Thus, the dis-
tinction between genocide and homicide becomes one of motive, the lat-
ter only applicable in American law to establish a case of first degree
murder.
By the language of article III, not only is genocide-as defined in
article II-a crime in international and (by incorporation under article I)
domestic law, but also proscribed are acts of conspiracy, incitement, at-
tempt, and complicity relating to the crime of genocide. None of these
punishable forms of conduct, as designated by article III, contain any
material elements whatsoever. There is no indication as to what method
of legal analysis obtains for ascertaining the required criminal liability
13 Le Blanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The Proposed U.S.
Understanding, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 369, 373 (1974).
14 Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CH.4/Sub. 2/416, at 14 (July 1978) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Genocide Study].
15 11 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 854 (M. Whiteman ed. 1968). His statement indicates
that genocide and homicide can be concurrent crimes, later denied by Deputy Undersecretary of
State Dean Rusk at the 1950 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings. See FOREIGN REL.
REP. (1984), supra note 2, at 9.
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connected with the aforementioned activities. Are all these crimes equal
in degree of culpability? Should they all be subject to the same punish-
ment? For that matter, what kind of punishment do they merit? On
each of these significant questions, the Convention is silent.
The rock upon which the Convention has foundered from its very
inception is that of the nature of criminal responsibility. The lessons of
history, politics, and reality clearly indicate that genocide is committed
by governments, not by individuals. An individual, or even a small
number of individuals, cannot wipe out an entire group, unless it is a very
small group indeed. Neither the designations of genocide provided by
the Convention, nor the definition offered by its forerunner, U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 96(I) of December 11, 1946,16 indicate that
genocide in its historic sense is a matter of state responsibility. A distin-
guished American political sociologist in a recent analysis has provided
the following definition: "Genocide is herein defined as a structural and
systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic appara-
tus. . . . Genocide means the physical dismemberment and liquidation
of people on large scales; an attempt by those who rule to achieve the
total elimination of a subject people."17 In other words, genocide is mass
murder perpetrated by a repressive government. To say, as does article
IV, that private individuals commit genocide is not only pure hyperbole,
but in the context of the so-called criminality of article II, it is a loaded
weapon pointed at the citizenry of any signatory state. 18
For these reasons, the Senate Committee's reservations to the adop-
tion of the Genocide Convention19 were designed to clarify the meaning
16 The General Assembly Resolution designated genocide as follows:
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the
denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence
shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cul-
tural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral
law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.
Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, polit-
ical and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.
The punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international concern.
G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188-89 (1946).
17 L HOROwITz, TAKING LIVES: GENOCIDE AND STATE POWER 17, 85 (3rd ed. 1980) (em-
phasis in original). Cf RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 (Tent. Draft No. 3, Mar. 15, 1982).
18 Originally, the American delegation urged co-responsibility between the individual and the
state. Treaties Should Not Be Used To Enact Domestic Legislation: Hearings on the Genocide Con-
vention Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1971)
(statement of Eberhard P. Deutsch) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings (1971)]. The U.N.
ECOSOC Special Rapporteur takes the view that states bear only political responsibility and not
criminal liability. U.N. Genocide Study, supra note 14, at 38.
19 GENOCIDE CONVENTION, S. EXEC. REP. No. 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-27 (1985) [herein-
after cited as SENATE RESERVATIONS].
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of intent, to refine the aspects of prohibited criminality so that they
would be in accord with the Anglo-American criminal justice system,
and to guarantee to all American citizens and resident aliens the substan-
tive and procedural protections of the U.S. Constitution. They transform
the Convention from an instrument whose content potentially endangers
the constitutional rights of American citizens (and the security of some
of our valued allies like Britain and Israel) ° into a symbolic denunciation
of a crime which every civilized society abhors. Since the Genocide Con-
vention deals with individuals rather than states, then the rights and lib-
erties of individuals living in free societies should be protected. The
Senate Reservations do exactly that.
CONCLUSION: TREATIES, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRESENT COMPLEXITIES AND
FUTURE CONCERNS
No court has ever declared a treaty unconstitutional, though a
number of landmark decisions2" indicate that the judicial branch has the
power to do so. Treaties and conventions, like statutes, are to be con-
strued reasonably and their words are to be interpreted in their ordinary
meaning. When a treaty lends itself to a dual interpretation, the broader
view of the rights of the parties is to be preferred.22 Although there
seems to be no precise pronouncement on the subject, since there is a
strong presumption of constitutionality with respect to acts of Congress,
it is reasonable to assume in the light of historical experience that the
same applies to treaties.23
The role of international law in domestic U.S. litigation has always
been a matter of some controversy. Thomas Jefferson warned from
Paris, during late December 1787, that international law should not be-
come the basis for trials in the United States.24 In contrast, the most
sweeping claim imaginable for the role of international law in U.S. mu-
nicipal jurisprudence was put forward by Justice Chase at the time of the
Jay Court, in the landmark case of Ware v. Hylton.25 Chase's notion that
international law imposed obligations on all courts, state and federal, and
upon all citizens, 26 was not only pure dictum, but was also ill-founded.
The succeeding Marshall Court rejected this approach, emphasizing in-
stead the importance of federal statutes. After more than a decade on the
20 Hatch, Reject the Genocide Convention, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at A27, col. 1.
21 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
22 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 270-72 (1890).
23 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1961).
24 Letter to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON
429 (M. Peterson ed. 1977).
25 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
26 Id. at 229.
Vol. 18:267
GENOCIDE CONVENTION
nation's highest bench, Marshall conceded in Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar
v. Boyle that the law of nations is partly unwritten, and partly conven-
tional: "[Its] principles will be differently understood by different nations
under different circumstances. . . . The decisions of the Courts of every
country, so far as they are founded upon a law common to every country,
will be received, not as authority, but with respect. 2 v
Two piracy cases, a little more than midway during Marshall's long
tenure on the Court, highlight the careful analysis by Justices Marshall
and Story of the connective links between international law and interna-
tional criminality. In United States v. Palmer,2" the U.S. government
maintained that without a prior statute, there could be no definition and
punishment of so-called international crime. The law of nations merely
created the offense. Its prosecution and punishment depends upon the
exercise of domestic jurisdiction under appropriate legislation.29 Mar-
shall apparently agreed, going on to point out the fundamental impor-
tance of specificity and precision of language in drafting statutory
crimes.3" In United States v. Smith,31 Justice Story reaffirmed the Mar-
shall analysis. Offenses against customary international law, Story ob-
served, "cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained
and defined in any public code recognized by the common consent of
nations. In respect, therefore, . . . as to offenses against the law of na-
tions, there is a peculiar fitness in giving the power to define as well as to
punish. . . ."I' Thus, "[t]o define piracies, in the sense of the constitu-
tion, is merely to enumerate the crimes which shall constitute piracy;"
and to include their elements.33 The bottom line for piracy and for all
other international crimes falling within U.S. domestic jurisdiction is that
"the law of nations. . . [cannot of itself] form a rule of action."34 This is
still the law today with respect to any act internationally proscribed by
custom, treaty, or convention.
It is the common wisdom among legal scholars that the Paquete Ha-
bana case, in its description of the role of international law, has made the
law of nations part of American legal doctrine: "International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination."35 One well-
27 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (emphasis added).
28 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
29 Id. at 620-21.
30 Id. at 628-30.
31 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
32 Id. at 159.
33 Id. at 160.
34 Id. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
35 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
respected contemporary commentator interprets this to mean that inter-
national law is in fact "part of 'the law of the land'., 3 6 Another prestigi-
ous analyst goes even further, flatly stating that customary international
law "is directly incorporable" into the American legal process.37 Small
wonder that following the Nuremberg Judgment, and just prior to the
U.N. approval of the Genocide Convention, a distinguished American
legalist would write that "[i]nternational law has imposed obligations on
states to punish certain acts committed in their territory, punishment of
which is primarily an interest of other states or of the community of
nations. . . ."' If this were true, then approving the Genocide Conven-
tion would be merely symbolic, since its provisions would already
control.39
The reality of the American system is best reflected in the sharp-
edged dicta of a 1925 Connecticut federal district court: "International
practice is law only in so far as we adopt it, and like all common or
statute law it bends to the will of Congress."''4 But in 1980, using Ware
v. Hylton, United States v. Smith, the Paquete Habana, and a single sen-
tence in The Nereide, Judge Irving Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, taking a dramatic departure from existing practice, claimed
that U.S. courts are indeed bound by the prevailing rules of international
law.4' Kaufman's opinion in Filartiga has become a rallying point for
those who would make the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, the two International Cove-
nants on Civil, Political, Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
self-executing in American law.4"
Filartiga creatively asserts that U.S. law is subject not only to the
U.N. Charter, but also to all relevant human rights instruments.43 It
adds the ringing statement that "[f]ederal jurisdiction over cases involv-
ing international law is clear."'  What is not clear is whether Kaufman
36 Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights Law into Domestic Law - U.S. Experience,
4 Hous. J. INT'L LAW 1, 2 (1981).
37 Paust, Litigating Human Rights in U.S. Courts, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 139 (1981).
38 Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 57 (1947).
39 The Eichmann Court on this issue was in agreement with the I.C.J. See Eichmann Judg-
ment, supra note 6, at 33-34.
40 The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925). A further pronouncement, though
undeniably dictum, adds: "It is not the function of treaties to enact the fiscal or criminal law of a
nation. For this purpose, no treaty is self-executing." Id. at 845. But the U.S. Supreme Court has
been silent on this issue.
41 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
42 See especially, Symposium-Federal Jurisdiction Human Rights, and the Law of Nations:
Essays on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, I1 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 304 (1981).
43 630 F.2d at 881-85.
44 Id. at 887.
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is also implying that the violation of human rights have a quasi-criminal
status in American courts. A resounding denial is offered by two opin-
ions in the three-judge per curiam decision of the D.C. Circuit in Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.45 Both Judge Bork and Judge Robb take
strong exception to the language and holding of Filartiga. Bork not only
claims that the Filartiga case, if generally followed, would make all U.S.
treaties self-executing, but also bluntly declares that the complaints
found in Tel-Oren and Filartiga "were beyond the framers' contempla-
tion."46 Robb is even more critical: "the case appears to me to be funda-
mentally at odds with the reality of the international structure and with
the role of United States courts within that structure."'47
In sum, the law is still not clear and convincing over the application
of quasi-criminal proscriptions by way of treaty and convention, or even
by executive agreement. The nature of the instrument is often self-exe-
cuting, while it may very well be that treaties can consist of executory
and self-executing provisions.48 It may also very well be that an analogy
may be drawn by the future courts between the theory of international
torts and the theory of international criminal law, which will once again
stretch the Constitution beyond the intention of the framers. A distin-
guished international lawyer and legal academic has cautioned that "it is
more fitting for the political branches to state United States viewpoints
on human rights internationally than for the courts to do so
unnecessarily."'49
Without the Senate Reservations, the Genocide Convention would
have had the effect of refashioning U.S. municipal law by utilizing what
appears to be a valid legal instrument, but which is actually burdened by
a misleading and misguided orientation, however noble its stated pur-
pose. The key provisions of the Genocide Convention are domestic
rather than international in their essential characteristics. If not limited
by the Senate Reservations, then the real consequences of its implementa-
tion could be far worse than the prevention sought. Recent approval by
the United States Senate5° with seven provisos and one declaration" will
lay to rest many of the legal concerns voiced by the Convention's oppo-
45 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1984)
(No. 83-2025).
46 Id. at 813.
47 Id. at 826 n.5.
48 2 C. ANTIEAU. MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE STATES AND FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT 572 (1969). The executive agreement discussed in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)
is surely self-executing.
49 Oliver, Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in Applying Norms of Customary Interna-
tional Law of Human Rights in United States Courts, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 59, 63 (1981).
50 132 CONG. REc. S1377 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (by a vote of 83-11, with six members not
voting).
51 See SENATE RESERVATIONS, supra note 19. For an in depth analysis of the Senate Reserva-
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nents. Yet, to date, the Genocide Convention has resolved nothing in a
world filled with oppressive mass-murdering regimes.2 There is no rea-
son to believe, in this regard, that the future will be any different than the
past.
tions labelled, see 132 CONG. REC. S1273-S1275 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1986) (floor speech ofSen. Orrin
G. Hatch).
52 Proponents of the unreserved Convention appear to emphasize the symbolic importance of
American approval and its supposed usefulness for the Helsinski follow-up conferences. See 7 ABA
Standing Committee on Law and National Security: Intelligence Report 1 (1985); Murphy, Human
Rights in United States Foreign Policy, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 133, 136 (1981); Feinrider, First Duty for
the US. Senate: Pass the Genocide Convention, Miami Herald, Dec. 31, 1984, at 9A, col. 3. Symbol-
ism, however, can build false hopes and be a cruel deceiver. The value of the Helsinki follow-up
meetings, and the U.N.-sponsored human rights conferences, with respect to actions of the Soviet
Bloc and the majority of the U.N. membership, has proved to be a will-o-the-wisp. The United
States would have been the target of the genocide provisions, and not the beneficiary, if the Senate
Reservations had not been approved by the United States Senate.
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